A network creation game simulates a decentralized and noncooperative construction of a communication network. Informally, there are n players sitting on the network nodes, which attempt to establish a reciprocal communication by activating, thereby incurring a certain cost, any of their incident links. The goal of each player is to have all the other nodes as close as possible in the resulting network, while buying as few links as possible. According to this intuition, any model of the game must then appropriately address a balance between these two conflicting objectives. Motivated by the fact that a player might have a strong requirement about her centrality in the network, we introduce a new setting in which a player who maintains her (maximum or average) distance to the other nodes within a given bound incurs a cost equal to the number of activated edges; otherwise her cost is unbounded. We study the problem of understanding the structure of pure Nash equilibria of the resulting games, which we call MAXBD and SUMBD, respectively. For both games, we show that when distance bounds associated with players are nonuniform, then equilibria can be arbitrarily bad. On the other hand, for MAXBD, we show that when nodes have a uniform bound D ≥ 3 on the maximum distance, then the price of anarchy (PoA) is lower and upper bounded by 2 and O(n 1 log 3 D +1 ), respectively (i.e., PoA is constant as soon as D is (n ), for any > 0), while for the interesting case D = 2, we are able to prove that the PoA is ( √ n) and O( n log n). For the uniform SUMBD, we obtain similar (asymptotically) results and moreover show that PoA becomes constant as soon as the bound on the average distance is 2 ω( √ log n) .
INTRODUCTION
Communication networks are rapidly evolving towards a model in which the constituting components (e.g., routers and links) are activated and maintained by different owners, like players sitting on the network nodes. When these players act in a selfish way with the final intent of creating a connected network, the main challenge is that of understanding whether the pursuit of individual profit is compatible with the attainment of an equilibrium status of the system (i.e., a status in which players are not willing to move from), and how the social utility of the system as a whole is affected by the selfish behavior of the individual players. While the former question is inherently game-theoretic and has been originally addressed [Jackson and Wolinsky 1996] by economists (for further references see also Chapter 6 in [Jackson 2008]) , the latter additionally involves computational issues, since it can be regarded as a comparison between the performances of an uncoordinated distributed system as opposed to a centralized system, which can optimally design a solution. Not surprisingly then, this class of games, which we refer to as network creation games (NCGs), have received a significant amount of attention from the computer science community, starting with Fabrikant et al. [2003] , which initially formalized and investigated the main computational aspects of an NCG. More precisely, the authors focus on an Internet-oriented NCG defined as follows: We are given a set of n players, say V , where the strategy space of player v ∈ V is the power set 2 V \{v} . Given a combination of strategies S = (S v ) v∈V , let G(S) denote the underlying undirected graph whose node set is V and whose edge set is E(S) = {(v, v ) | v ∈ V ∧ v ∈ S v }. Then, the cost incurred by player v in S is
where d G(S) (u, v) is the distance between nodes u and v in G(S). Thus, the cost function implements the inherently antagonistic goals of a player, which on the one hand attempt to buy as few edges as possible, and on the other hand aim to be as close as possible to the other nodes in the outcoming network. These two criteria are suitably balanced (1) by making use of the parameter α ≥ 0. Consequently, the Nash equilibria 1 (NE) space of the game is heavily influenced by α, and the corresponding characterization must be given as a function of it. Actually, if we characterize such a space in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA), then this has been shown to be constant for all values of α except n 1−ε ≤ α ≤ 65 n, for any ε ≥ 1/ log n (see [Mamageishvili et al. 2013; Mihalák and Schlegel 2013] ).
Further NCG Models. A first natural variant of SUMNCG was introduced in Demaine et al. [2007] , where the authors redefined the player cost function as follows.
This variant, named MAXNCG, received further attention in Mihalák and Schlegel [2013] , where the authors improved the PoA of the game on the whole range of values of α, obtaining, in this case, that PoA is constant for all values of α except 129 > α = ω(1/ √ n). However, a criticism for both of these models is that usage and building costs are summed up together in the player's cost, and this mixing is reflected in the social cost of the resulting network. Consequently, the PoA alone does not say so much about the structural properties of the network, such as density, diameter, or routing cost. Moreover, Demaine et al. [2007] and Mihalák and Schlegel [2013] both incorporate in the cost function the parameter α, which is in a sense artificially introduced in order to suitably balance usage and building cost. Thus, in an effort to address these critical issues, Laoutaris et al. [2014] propose an interesting variant in which a player v, when forming the network, has a limited budget b v to establish links to other players. This way, the player cost function restricts the usage cost, namely, either the maximum or the total distance to other nodes. For these bounded-budget versions of the game, which we call MAXBB and SUMBB, respectively, Laoutaris et al. showed that determining the existence of an NE is NP-hard. On a positive note, they proved that for unitary edge costs and uniform budgets, say k, both variants always admit an NE with a price of stability (PoS) of (1). Moreover, they prove that the PoA of MAXBB is ( n k log k n ) and O( n log k n ), while the PoA of SUMBB is ( n k log k n ) and O( n log k n ). Notice that in both MAXBB and SUMBB, links are considered as directed. Thus, a natural extension of the model was given in Ehsani et al. [2011] , were the undirected case was studied. For this, it was proven that both MAXBB and SUMBB always admit an NE. Moreover, the authors showed that the PoA for MAXBB and SUMBB is ( log n) and 2 O( √ log n) , respectively, while in the special case in which the budget is equal to 1 for all players, the PoA is O(1) for both versions of the game.
In all these models, it must be noticed that, as stated in Fabrikant et al. [2003] , it is NP-hard for a player to find a best response once other players' strategies are fixed. To circumvent this problem, Alon et al. [2013] propose a further variant, called basic NCG (BNCG), in which, given some existing network, the only improving transformations allowed are edge swaps, that is, a player can only modify a single incident edge, either by replacing it with a new incident edge or by removing it. This naturally induces a weaker concept of equilibrium for which a player's best response can be computed in polynomial time. In this setting, the authors were able to give, among other results, an upper bound of 2 O( √ log n) for the PoA of SUMBNCG, and a lower bound of ( √ n) for the PoA of MAXBNCG. However, as pointed out by Mihalák and Schlegel [2013] , the fact that an edge now does not have a specific owner prevents the possibility of establishing any implications on the PoA of the classic NCG, since an NE in a BNCG is not necessarily an NE of an NCG. Finally, we note that another NCG model (barely related to the NCG model we study here) has been addressed [Baumann and Stiller 2008] .
Our Results. In this article, we propose a new NCG variant that complements the model proposed by Ehsani et al. [2011] . More precisely, we assume that the cost function of each player only consists of the number of bought edges (without any budget on them), but with the additional constraint that each player v needs to stay within a given (either maximum or average) distance, say D v , from the other players.
For this bounded-distance version of NCG, we address understanding the structure of the NE associated with the two variants of the game, which we denote MAXBD and SUMBD. Since the social cost in our model only consists of the number of edges in the network, our study will provide qualitative insights about the density of networks in equilibrium. In this respect, we first show that both games can have an unbounded PoA as soon as players hold at least two different distance bounds. Moreover, we also show that in both game, computing a best response for a player is NP-hard. These issues are counterbalanced by the positive results we get for uniform distance bounds. In this case, first the PoS for MAXBD is first equal to 1, while for SUMBD it is at most 2. Then, as far as PoA is concerned, let D denote the uniform bound on the distance. We show the following.
(i) For MAXBD, for D = 2, the PoA is lower and upper bounded by ( √ n) and O( n log n), respectively, while for D ≥ 3, we have 2 ≤ PoA = O(n 1 log 3 D +1 ) (notice that for D = 1, the only NE is a clique with arbitrary ownership on the edges, which is clearly also optimal, and so PoA is equal to 1).
(ii) For SUMBD, the PoA is lower bounded by 2 − , for any > 0, as soon as D ≥ 2 − 3/n, while it is upper bounded as reported in 
only NE is a clique with arbitrary ownership on the edges, which is clearly also optimal, so PoA is equal to 1).
Thus, while the PoA is mostly constant for the classic sum and max versions of NCG, for our games (as for the other NCG variants proposed in the literature and discussed), this is not the case. However, a closer inspection of our previously results suggests that PoA becomes constant (i.e., the density of an equilibrium network is linear) as soon as the maximum/average distance bound is (n ), for any > 0, or the density is o(n 1+ ), for any > 0, if we allow for a logarithmic distance bound. This is quite interesting, since it implies that the autonomous network tends to be rapidly sparse as soon as the distance bounds grow. Notice that in the Fabrikant et al. model (and its variants) , we cannot directly infer any information about network sparseness by just knowing that the PoA is constant. Our results regarding density become particularly interesting when they are coupled with the diameter of a network in equilibrium, which is clearly bounded by D for MAXBD and-as we will formally prove in the paper-by 2D for SUMBD. Finally, focusing on MAXBD, we observe that when D = 2, which could potentially model the scenario depicted by local-area networks, we obtain the meaningful result that PoA is far from being constant and that its lower and upper bounds are very close.
Motivation and Significance of the New Model. Our model was originally motivated by the observation that, in a realistic scenario, a player might have a strong objective/requirement about her centrality in the outcoming network. In fact, in daily life, people actively participate in autonomous formation of (social) networks. In our experience, a user downplays any concerns about the number/cost of activated links. Rather, she initially pays attention only to remaining as close as possible to (a subset of) other users; only later on does she try to minimize her outdegree accordingly. Our model aims to (partially) address this dynamic. Actually, at this initial stage, we have relaxed this quite complicated setting by associating with each user just a (uniform) single distance bound with respect to all other users. Even in this simplified scenario, compared to previous studies, our results provide new insights about the structural properties of stable networks, as discussed previously. Furthermore, our model (as well as those proposed by Alon et al. [2013] , Ehsani et al. [2011] , and Laoutaris et al. [2014] ), does not rely on the α parameter, making proofs of the various bounds intimately related with some graph-theoretic properties of a stable network. For example, as we will show, in our setting, the minimum degree and the size of a minimum dominating set play important roles in stable networks. In the concluding remarks of this article, we pose an intriguing relationship between our problem and the well-known graph-theoretic degree-diameter problem, which we believe could help in solving some of the issues that are still left open, like the quite large gap between lower and upper bounds on the PoA.
The article is organized as follows. After giving some basic definitions in Section 2, we provide some preliminary results in Section 3. Then, we study upper and lower bounds for uniform MAXBD and SUMBD in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude by discussing some intriguing relationships between our games with the degree-diameter problem.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
Graph Terminology. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected (simple) graph with n vertices. For a graph G, we will also denote by V (G) and E(G) its set of vertices and its set of edges, respectively. For
, is equal to max u∈V d G (u, v) . The diameter and the radius of G are equal to the maximum and minimum eccentricity of its nodes, respectively. A node v is said to be a center of G if ε G (v) is equal to the radius of G. We define the broadcast cost of v in G as B G (v) = u∈V d G (u, v) , while the average distance from v to a node in G (i.e., the average eccentricity of node v) is denoted byε
A dominating set of G is a subset of nodes U ⊆ V such that every node of V \ U is adjacent to some node of U . We denote by γ (G) the cardinality of a minimum-size dominating set of G. Moreover, for any real x, the xth power of G is defined as the graph
, where
We denote by G + F the graph on V with edge set E ∪ F. When F = {e}, we will denote G + {e} by G + e.
Statement of Problems.
The bounded maximum-distance NCG (MAXBD) is defined as follows: Let V be a set of n nodes, each representing a selfish player, and for any v ∈ V , let D v ≥ 1 be an integer representing a bound on the eccentricity of v. The strategy of a player v consists of a subset S v ⊆ V \ {v}. Denoting by S the strategy profile of all players, let G(S) be the undirected graph with node set V and with edge set
2 When u ∈ S v , we say that v is buying the edge (u, v), or that the edge (u, v) is bought by v. Then, the cost of a player v in S is
The bounded average-distance NCG (SUMBD) is defined analogously, with a real bound D v ≥ 1 − 1/n on the average distance of v from all the other nodes, and cost function
In both variants, we say that a node v is within the bound in S (or in G(S)) if its distance (either maximum or average) to the other nodes is within its given bound D v . We measure the overall quality of a graph G(S) by its social cost
We use the Nash Equilibrium (NE) as a solution concept. More precisely, an NE is a strategy profile S in which no player can decrease her cost by changing her strategy, assuming that the strategies of the other players are fixed. When S is an NE, we say that G(S) is stable. Conversely, a graph G is said to be stable if there exists an NE S such that G = G(S). Notice that in both games, when S is an NE, all nodes are within the bound, and since every edge is bought by exactly one of the endpoints, SC(S) coincides with the number of edges of G(S). We conclude this section by recalling the definition of the two measures we will use to characterize the NE space of our games, namely, the price of anarchy (PoA) [Fabrikant et al. 2003 ] and the price of stability (PoS) [Anshelevich et al. 2008] , which are defined as the ratio between the highest (respectively, lowest) social cost of an NE, and the cost of a social optimum.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
First observe that for MAXBD, it is easy to see that a stable graph always exists. Indeed, if there is at least one node having distance bound 1, then the graph where all 1-bound nodes have degree n − 1 is stable. Otherwise, any spanning star is stable. Notice that any spanning star is stable for SUMBD as well, but only when every vertex has a bound D v ≥ 2 − 3/n (i.e., the average distance from a leaf to a node of the star). Thus, the problem of establishing whether an NE exists whenever at least one player has a distance bound less than 2 − 3/n is open. In contrast, as we will prove, in the uniform case (namely, all nodes have a common distance bound), an NE always exists for SUMBD. From these observations, we can derive the following negative result. THEOREM 3.1. The PoA of MAXBD and SUMBD is (n), even for only two distancebound values.
PROOF. We exhibit a graph G with (n 2 ) edges which is stable in both models for suitable distance bounds. Then, we will show that in both cases the cost of the social optimum is n − 1.
The graph G is defined as follows. We have a clique of k nodes. For each node v of the clique, we add four nodes v 
v).
Clearly, G has n = 5k nodes and (n 2 ) edges. Now, consider a strategy profile S with G = G(S) such that (i) every edge is bought by exactly one of its endpoint players, and (ii) the edges (v Figure 1) . Now, we show that S is an NE in both games once we have defined suitable bounds for the players.
Let us consider MAXBD first. We set the bound of every node of the clique to 3, while all the other nodes have bound 5. Trivially, all nodes are within the bound. Moreover, a node v j i is buying only one edge, and since the removal of such edge disconnects the graph, v j i cannot decrease its cost. Let v be a node of the clique and assume that v is buying h edges in S. Let S be a strategy profile where v switches its strategy S v with S v such that |S v | < h. Since h ≤ k − 1, there must exist a vertex u of the clique such that u ∈ S v and u, u
Concerning SUMBD, we set the bound D v of each node v of the clique exactly equal to
while we assign to all the other nodes a bound of n. Similar arguments used for MAXBD can be used to show that S is an NE for SUMBD as well.
To conclude the proof, observe that since 11k−5 n > 2 − 3/n, any star (with cost n − 1) is a social optimum for the two instances of MAXBD and SUMBD previously given.
Given Theorem 3.1, from now on we focus on the uniform version of the games, and we call D the common distance bound. Similarly to other NCGs, here we also have the problem of computing a best response for a player, as stated in the following theorem. PROOF. Let us consider MAXBD first. The reduction is from the NP-hard minimum dominating set problem which, given a graph G = (V , E ), asks to find a dominating set of G of minimum cardinality, say γ (G ). Let N = |V |. We build a graph G with n = N + 2N(D − 2) + 1 vertices as follows: We have an isolated vertex u, a copy of G , and two paths of length D − 2 appended to every vertex v ∈ V . Now, let S be a strategy profile such that G = G(S). Clearly, cost u (S) = +∞, and it is easy to see that u has a strategy yielding a cost of k if and only if γ (G ) ≤ k. Now, for SUMBD, we outline a reduction from the k-median problem. Let G = (V , E ) be an instance of the k-median problem which, given a value β, asks to find a subset
This problem is NP-hard even when G is an unweighted graph [Kariv and Hakimi 1979] . Let G be the graph defined as G with an additional isolated node u, and let S be a strategy profile such that G = G(S), and let D = β+N N+1
. It is easy to see that u has a strategy yielding a cost of k if and only if G has a k-median of cost at most β.
On the other hand, a positive result clearly implying that SUMBD always admits a pure NE is as follows. THEOREM 3.3. The PoS of MAXBD is 1, while for SUMBD it is at most 2.
PROOF. Concerning MAXBD, it is easy to see that when D = 1, the complete graph is a social optimum as well as the only stable graph, while for D > 1, any spanning star is a social optimum as well as a stable graph.
Concerning SUMBD, let B = D · n . As previously stated, if D ≥ 2 − 3/n, that is, if B ≥ 2n − 3, then any spanning star is a stable graph, and of course it is also a social optimum. Moreover, observe that for D = 1 − 1/n, that is, B = n− 1, the complete graph is a social optimum as well as the only stable graph. Then, assume that B = n − 1 + k, with 1 ≤ k < n − 2. We will define a graph G with a number of edges that is at most twice the number of edges of the optimum, and we will show that it is stable. Let h ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ k be integers such that n = (k + 1)h + t. We partition V into h groups of k + 1 nodes, say V 1 , . . . , V h and, when t = 0, an additional group V 0 of t vertices. The edge set of G is defined as
Let S be a strategy profile such that G = G(S) with the constraint that every node in V 0 buys no edge in S. Clearly, every node in G is within the bound. Moreover, observe that in order to be within the bound, each node v must have degree at least n − 1 − k. Now, since every node not in V 0 has degree exactly n − 1 − k, and since nodes in V 0 buy no edges, then G(S) is stable. To bound the social cost of G, notice that the cost of the optimum, say OPT, is at least
. Let us consider the case in which k < n/2. Then, OPT ≥ n 2 /4, while SC(S) ≤ n 2 /2 ≤ 2 · OPT. On the other hand, when k ≥ n/2, we have only two groups, one with t = n − k − 1 nodes and the other with n − t nodes. Then, we have
We conclude this section by providing a few lemmas which will give some preliminary upper bounds to the social cost of a stable graph for our games and which will be useful in proving our final results. The next three lemmas hold for both MAXBD and SUMBD.
LEMMA 3.4. Let G(S) be stable and let H be a subgraph of G(S). If for each node v ∈ V there exists a set E v of edges (all incident to v) such that v is within the bound in
PROOF. Let k v be the number of edges of H that v is buying in S. If v buys edges of E v additionally to its k v edges, then v will be within the bound in H + E v . Hence, since S is an NE, we have cost v (S) ≤ k v + |E v |, from which it follows that
Hence, we have the following two consequent lemmas.
LEMMA 3.5. Let G(S) be stable, and let δ be the minimum degree of G(S), then SC(S)
PROOF. Let u be a node of minimum degree δ, and let T be a shortest-path tree of
As u is within the bound in T , every other node v is within the bound in T + E v . Therefore, from Lemma 3.4 we have It is easy to see that there exists a spanning forest F of G(S) consisting of γ trees T 1 , . . . , T γ , such that every T j contains exactly one vertex in U , and when we root T j at such a vertex, the height of T j is at most 1 if D < 2, and at most D − 1 otherwise.
Clearly, v is within the bound in F + E v for both MAXBD and SUMBD, since its eccentricty is at most 2 if D < 2, and at most D otherwise. Hence, by using Lemma 3.4, we have
On the other hand, as far as SUMBD is concerned when 1 − 1/n < D < 2 − 3/n, we can provide another upper bound, which relies on a general property about the degree of a node which is within the bound, as expressed by the following. 
PROOF. Let δ v be the degree of v in G(S).
This means that there are n− 1 − δ v vertices whose distance in G(S) from v is greater than or equal to 2. Therefore,
from which the claim follows. Let δ D denote the lower bound to the minimum degree of an in-bound node deriving from Proposition 3.7. By definition, δ D is the minimum integer such that D ≥ 2 − 2/n− δ D /n. From this, we can prove the following. 
PROOF. Let U be a minimum dominating set of G(S), then γ = |U |. It is easy to see that there exists a spanning forest F of G(S) consisting of γ stars T 1 , . . . , T γ , such that every T j contains exactly one vertex in U , and when we root T j at such a vertex, the height of T j is at most 1.
For
It is now easy to see that v is within the bound in
and from the assumption, we have δ
Thus, the claim follows from Lemma 3.4 by observing that
UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS ON THE POA FOR MAXBD

Upper Bounds
We start by giving our upper bound to PoA for MAXBD. PROOF. Let us consider the case D ≥ 3 first. Let G = G(S) be a stable graph, and let γ be the size of a minimum dominating set of G D−1 . We define the ball of radius k centered at a node u of G as
The idea is to show that in G, the size of any ball increases quite fast as soon as the radius of the ball increases. LEMMA 4.2. Let G be a stable graph for an instance of MAXBD. Then, for any k ≥ 1, we have β 3k+1 ≥ min{n, γβ k }.
PROOF. Consider the ball β 3k+1 (u) centered at any given node u. Trivially, if D ≤ 3k+1, then β 3k+1 (u) = V , and so the claim is true. Then, let D > 3k + 1, and assume that |β 3k+1 (u)| < n. Let P be a maximal set of nodes such that (i) the distance from every vertex in P and u is exactly 2k + 1, and (ii) the distance between any pair of nodes in P is at least 2k + 1. We claim that for every node v / ∈ β 3k+1 (u), there is a vertex t ∈ P with d G (t, v) < d G (u, v) . Indeed, consider the node t in a shortest path in G between v and u at distance exactly 2k + 1 from u. If t ∈ P, the claim trivially holds; otherwise, consider the node t ∈ P that is closest to t (see Figure 2) . From the maximality of P, we have that 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that G is stable. Consequently, we have that P ∪ {u} is a dominating set of G D−1 , and hence |P| + 1 ≥ γ . Moreover, all the balls centered at nodes in P ∪ {u} with radius k are pairwise disjoint and are all in β 3k+1 (u). Then,
Now, observe that since the neighborhood of any node in G is a dominating set of G D−1 , we have that β 1 ≥ γ . Then, after using the preceding claim x times, we obtain
Now let U be a maximal independent set of G D−1 . Since U is also a dominating set of G D−1 , it holds that |U | ≥ γ . We consider the |U | balls centered at nodes in U with radius given by the value of the parameter x = log 3 D − 1 . Every ball has radius at most (D − 1)/2, and since U is an independent set of G D−1 , all the balls are pairwise disjoint, and hence we have n ≥ |U |γ log 3 D−1 +1 ≥ γ log 3 D +1 . Consequently, we obtain γ ≤ n 1 log 3 D +1 , and the claim for D ≥ 3 now follows from Lemma 3.6. Let us now consider the case D = 2. Let δ be the minimum degree of G. From the general bound given by Alon and Spencer [1992] , which puts into relationship the size of a minimum dominating set and the minimum degree of a graph, we have that γ ≤ n δ+1 H δ+1 , where H i = i j=1 1/j is the ith harmonic number. Hence, from this bound, and since a social optimum has cost n − 1, from Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6, we have that
for our stable graph G = G(S). Since this is asymptotically maximized when δ = ( n log n), the claim follows.
Lower Bounds
Now we focus on lower bounds to the PoA of MAXBD. We first prove a simple constant lower bound for D = o(n), and then we show an almost tight lower bound of ( √ n) for D = 2. We discuss the difficulty of finding better lower bounds for large values of D in the conclusion. PROOF. Assume we are given a set of n = 2D + h vertices {u 1 , . . . , u 2D } ∪ {v 1 , . . . , v h }. The strategy profile S is defined as follows. Vertex u j buys a single edge towards u j+1 , for each j = 1, . . . , 2D − 1, while every v i buys two edges towards u 1 and u 2D . It is easy to see that G(S) has diameter D and is stable. The claim follows from the fact that SC(S) goes to 2(n − 1) as h goes to infinity, and, as observed in Section 3, a spanning star (having social cost equal to n − 1) is a social optimum.
We close this section by providing a much stronger lower bound for the special case in which D = 2. Before stating the theorem, we give some additional notation. Let S ¬v denote the strategy profile obtained from S, where each player but v plays the same strategy as in S, while v buys no edge, that is, the strategy of v is ∅. We define F(v) = {u ∈ V | d G(S ¬v ) (u, v) > 2}, and we denote by γ (v) the size of a minimum cardinality set X ⊆ V of vertices that dominates F(v) in G(S ¬v ), that is, for every vertex u ∈ F(v) there exists a vertex x ∈ X such that either x = u or (x, u) ∈ E(G(S ¬v )). The following proposition, whose proof is straightforward, provides exact bounds to the cost incurred by each player and will be used in the proof of the lower bound.
PROPOSITION 4.4. Let S be a strategy profile such that G(S) is a connected graph of diameter 2. The cost incurred by each player v in S in MAXBD with bound D = 2 is |S v | ≥ γ (v). Moreover, a player v is playing her best strategy in S iff |S v | = γ (v).
We are now ready to prove the following.
PROOF. Let p ≥ 3 be a prime number. We provide a stable graph G of diameter 2 containing O( p 2 ) vertices and ( p 3 ) edges. Let T be a complete p-ary tree of height 2. We denote by r the root of T , by C = {c 0 , . . . , c p−1 } the set of children of r, and by V i = {v i,0 , . . . , v i, p−1 } the set of children of c i . Moreover, let T be a star with p 2 leaves rooted at the center r and such that the leaves of T are partitioned into p groups, each having exactly p vertices. For every i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, we denote by U i = {u i,0 , . . . , u i, p−1 } the set of vertices of group i. Then, the graph G = (V, E) has vertex set V = V (T ) ∪ V (T ) and edge set (see also Figure 3 , which reports the graph G along with the strategies that will be induced by S, as explained later)
We claim that the diameter of G is 2. LetV andŪ be the set of leaves of T and T , respectively. The eccentricity of r is 2, as T has height 2, T has height 1, and G contains the edge (r, r ). Observe that the subgraphs of G induced by C and U i , for all i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, are all cliques of p vertices. Furthermore, by construction, there is an edge linking each vertex u ∈Ū with some v ∈ V i , for every i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, and thus V i dominatesŪ . Therefore, the eccentricity of each vertex in C is 2. Consequently, to prove that G has diameter 2, it is enough to prove the follwing.
(i) U i dominatesV , for every i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} (so as each vertex inŪ would have eccentricity 2). Fig. 3 . The graph G(S), where edges have been oriented according to S (edges are bought from the nodes they exit from). Notice that nodes in grey boxes are clique-connected (with arbitrary orientations), and for the sake of readability, we have only inserted edges leading to node u i, j .
(ii) For every pair v ∈ V i and v ∈ V i , i, i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, i = i , there is a vertex u ∈Ū such that (v, u) , (v , u) ∈ E (so as each vertex inV would have eccentricity 2).
To prove (i), simply observe that for every i , j ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, there always exists a j ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} such that j + i i ≡ j (mod p), and thus, (
To complete the proof, it remains to show that there exists a strategy profile S such that G(S) = G and G(S) is stable. Let S be any strategy profile where (see Figure 3 ) the following holds.
(1) Each edge of G(S) is bought by exactly one player.
(2) Each vertex inV ∪ {r} buys all the edges incident to it. (3) For every u ∈Ū , the edge (r , u) is bought by player u.
Let v be a player and letS be the strategy profile obtained from S, where v buys all its incident edges except for those which are already bought by other player, as specified in (2) and (3). We claim that if v is playing its best strategy inS, then v is playing its best strategy in S as well. Indeed, let S = (S v , S −v ). Notice that if S v is an improving strategy in S, then S v ∪ (S v \ S v ) is an improving strategy inS. Therefore, without loss of genrality, when we consider a player v, we assume that S is the strategy profile in which v buys all its incident edges except for those which are already bought by other players, as specified in (2) and (3). Observe the following.
-r buys no edge in S.
-Each vertex in set C buys exactly p − 1 edges in S.
-Each vertex in setŪ buys exactly p edges in S.
-Each vertex in setV ∪ {r} buys exactly p + 1 edges in S.
First observe that
indifferently use bound D on the average distance as well as the corresponding bound B = D · n on the broadcast cost.
PROOF. Let δ D be the smallest positive integer such that D ≥ 2−2/n−δ D /n. Let δ and γ be the minimum degree and the size of the minimum dominating set of a stable graph G(S), respectively. From Lemma 3.5, the social cost of an NE is O(δn). Furthermore, from Lemma 3.8, the social cost of an NE is O((γ + δ D )n). Since γ = O( n δ log n) [Alon and Spencer 1992] 
Therefore, the social cost of S is upper bounded by
Since by definition δ D is a lower bound to the degree of an in-bound node (see Proposition 3.7), it follows that the cost of a social optimum is (δ D · n), and so we have that
Observe that the upper bound to the PoA of Theorem 5.2 is constant for every 1−1/n ≤
PROOF. Let us consider the case D ≥ 3 first. Let G = G(S) be a stable graph, and let ρ := SC(S)/(n − 1) − 1. Recall that we denote the ball of radius k centered at a node u by β k (u), and that β k = min u∈V |β k (u)|. We have the following. LEMMA 5.4. Let G be a stable graph for an instance of SUMBD. Then, for any k ≥ 1, we have β 3k+2 ≥ min{n/2 + 1, ρ β k }.
PROOF. Consider the ball β 3k+2 (u) centered at any given node u and assume that |β 3k+2 (u)| ≤ n/2. Let P be a maximal set of nodes at distance exactly 2k + 2 from u and subject to the distance between any pair of nodes in P being at least 2k + 1. We claim that for every node v / ∈ β 3k+2 (u), there is a vertex
Indeed, consider the node t in the shortest path between v and u at distance exactly 2k + 2 from u. If t ∈ P, the claim trivially holds; otherwise consider the node t ∈ P closest to t . From the maximality of P,
Let H be the forest consisting of the following disjoint trees F t , for every node t ∈ P ∪ {u}: Let U t be the set of nodes closer to t than to any other t ∈ P ∪ {u}, then F t is the subtree of a shortest-path tree of G rooted at t that spans U t . Since u is within the bound in G and |β 3k+2 (u)| ≤ n/2, it is easy to see that every vertex x is within the bound in H + E x , where E x := {(x, t) | t ∈ (P ∪ {u}) \ {x}}. Hence, from Lemma 3.4, we have that
= (n − (|P| + 1)) + (|P| + 1)(n − 1) ≤ (|P| + 2)(n − 1), and hence |P| + 1 ≥ ρ . Now, all the balls centered at nodes in P ∪ {u} with radius k are pairwise disjoint and are all in β 3k+2 (u). Then,
Now, observe that β 1 ≥ ρ , since β 1 is clearly at least δ + 1, and from Lemma 3.5, ρ + 1 := SC(S)/(n− 1) ≤ δ + 1. Then, after using the preceding claim x times, we obtain
Now let U be a maximal independent set of G D−1 . Since U is also a dominating set of G D−1 , by Lemma 3.6 it holds that |U | ≥ ρ . We consider the |U | balls centered at nodes in U of radius equal to (D − 1)/2 . Since U is an independent set of G D−1 , all the balls are pairwise disjoint, and hence we have n ≥ |U | ρ log 3 (D+1)/4 +1 ≥ ρ log 3 (D+1)/4 +2 .
Consequently, we obtain ρ ≤ n 1 log 3 (D+1)/4 +2 , and the claim follows. Let us now consider the case 2 − 3/n ≤ D < 3. Observe that in such a case, G D−1 = G, and so we can apply the same argument we used for the case D = 2 in Theorem 4.1.
From the preceding result, it follows that PoA becomes constant when D = (n ), for any > 0. We now show how to lower such a threshold to D = 2 ω(
LEMMA 5.
Let G(S) be stable and let v be a node such that B G(S)
PROOF. Let T be a shortest-path tree of G(S) rooted at v. The claim immediately follows from Lemma 3.4 by observing that v is within the bound in T and every other node u is within the bound in T + (u, v).
Notice that Lemma 5.5 shows that when a stable graph G has diameter of at most D − 1, then the social cost of G is at most twice the optimum. In the following, we characterize the cases for which this happens, as a function of D. PROOF. We start by proving two lemmas.
LEMMA 5.7. Let G be stable with minimum degree δ ≥ 20. Then, either G has diameter at most 2 log n, or, for every node u, there is a node x with d G (u, x) ≤ log n such that (i) x is buying at least 2 edges, and (ii) the removal of such edges increases the sum of distances from x by at most 2n(1 + log n).
PROOF. Assume that the diameter of G is greater than 2 log n and consider a node u. Let U j be the set of nodes at distance exactly j from u, and let n j = |U j |. Moreover, denote by T a shortest-path tree of G rooted at node u. Let i be the minimum index such that n i+1 < 2n i (note that i must exist since the height of T is greater than log n, and it must be i ≤ log n). Consider the set of edges F of G having both endpoints in U i−1 ∪ U i ∪ U i+1 and that do not belong to T . By construction of T , all the edges of G incident to nodes in U i must have the other endpoint in U i−1 ∪ U i ∪ U i+1 . Then, since at most 3n i of them belong to T , we have |F| ≥ δn i /2 − 3n i . Moreover, since n i ≥ 2n i−1 , we have n i−1 + n i + n i+1 ≤ n i /2 + n i + 2n i = 7n i /2. Consequently, there is a vertex x ∈ U i−1 ∪ U i ∪ U i+1 which is buying at least
edges of F, that is, at least δ−6 7 ≥ 2 edges, since δ ≥ 20. Moreover, when x removes all of these edges, its distance to any other node increases by at most 2(1 + log n), because for each of these edges, say (x, v) , there is a detour in T from x to v passing from u of length at most 1 + 2 log n. The claim follows.
LEMMA 5.8. Let G be stable with minimum degree δ ≥ 20. Then, for every node u of degree less than n − 1, the addition of any edge incident to u decreases the sum of distances from u by at most 5n log n.
PROOF. If G has diameter at most 5 log n, then the claim trivially holds. Otherwise, let u be any node of G. Since the diameter of G is larger than 2 log n, we can make use of Lemma 5.7, and let x play the same role it had there (in particular, d G (u, x) ≤ log n). Now, assume by contradiction that the sum of distances from u decreases by more than 5nlog n when we add any edge e = (u, v) to G. Note that it must be d G (u, v) > 5 log n. Against the fact that G is stable, we now show that x can reduce its cost in G by saving one edge as follows: x deletes any pair of its edges, say f, f , and adds e = (x, v). Indeed, after removing these edges, from Lemma 5.7 we have that the sum of distances from x increases by at most 2n(1 + log n) ≤ 4n log n. We now show that when we add e , the sum of distances from x in G := G − { f, f } + e decreases by at least 4n log n. Indeed, let V be the set of nodes which get closer to u once we add (u, v) to G. We have
Hence, x is still within the bound in G and it is saving one edge, a contradiction.
We now show, by using similar arguments to those in Alon et al. [2013] , that in G the following holds:
To prove that, let u ∈ V be any node and assume that |β 4k (u)| ≤ n/2. Let P be a maximal set of nodes such that (i) the distance from every vertex in P and u is exactly 3k, and (ii) the distance between any pair of nodes in P is at least 2k + 1. From the maximality of P, by using a similar argument as that in Lemma 4.2, it is easy to see that for every node v / ∈ β 3k (u), there is a node t ∈ P such that
, at least n/2 nodes have a distance more than 3k from u. Letβ 3k denote such a set. Then, there are at least n/(2|P|) nodes inβ 3k that are closer to a same vertex t ∈ P than to u by at least k. Then, by adding an edge from u to t, the sum of distances from u decreases by at least
, which is at least equal to kn 4|P| for any k ≥ 2. By Lemma 5.8, this improvement is at most 5n log n and, as a consequence, |P| ≥ k 20 log n . Moreover, all the balls of radius k centered at nodes in P are disjoint and are all in β 4k (u): this proves recurrence (3). Hence, the claim will follow by solving such a recurrence. In fact, observe that β 2 √ log n ≥ 2 √ log n simply because the graph is connected. Starting with this k = 2 √ log n and applying (3), whenever we multiply k by 4, β k increases by a factor of at least k 20 log n ≥ 2
unless β k is already more than n/2. Taking logarithms, O( log n) such iterations suffice to reach a k, where β k > n/2. The diameter of the graph is then at most twice such a 
PROOF. Let G(S) be stable, and let d be the diameter of G(S). If the minimum degree δ of G(S)
is O(1), then from Lemma 3.5, we have that the PoA is O(1). Hence, consider the case in which δ = ω(1), and then Theorem 5.6 applies, that is, we have that
for every v. Therefore, Lemma 5.5 implies that the PoA is at most 2.
Then, by combining the results of Theorems 5.3 and 5.9, we get the bounds reported in Table I .
Lower Bound
We can finally give the following. PROOF. To prove the theorem, we use the following scheme. First, for every integer k ≥ 2, we provide a family G k of graphs that are stable when B ∈ λ(k, n), λ (k, n) , where n is the size of the input graph, and λ, λ are functions of k and n (with λ(k, n) < λ (k, n)) that will be specified later. We also prove that the social cost of infinitely many graphs in G k is at least 2 − away from the social cost of an optimum, for every k = o(n). Then, we show that λ(2, n) ≤ 2n − 3, λ(k + 1, n) ≤ λ (k, n), and λ(k, n) = (kn). Altogether, these three conditions imply that for every B in the range of the claim we can choose an integer k = o(n) such that B ∈ λ(k, n), λ (k, n) , and consequently we can exhibit a graph in G k for which the PoA is at least 2 − .
Family G k contains a graph G k,h for every positive integer h. More precisely, G k,h has n k,h = (h + 1)k vertices and m k,h = 2kh edges. Therefore, the lower bound of 2 − for the PoA when k = o(n) will follow by choosing h ≥ 2 − 1. For the rest of the proof, we assume that h is an arbitrary but fixed positive integer. Moreover, with a little abuse of notation, we will drop the subscript h from G k,h , and n k,h , and we will also drop the parameter n k = n k,h as argument of the two functions λ and λ .
The graph G k is a highly symmetric graph consisting of k ≥ 2 basic nodes {u 0 , . . . , u k−1 }, which buy no edge, and, for every i = 0, . . . , k − 1, of h copy nodes v i, j , j = 1, . . . , h, each buying exactly two edges: one towards u i , and the other one towards u i+1 mod k (see Figure 4) . Observe that G k has diameter k.
Let v denote a generic copy node. Let λ(k) andλ(k) be defined as the broadcast cost of v and u j , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, respectively. It is easy to see that λ(2) = 2n 2 − 4,λ(2) = n 2 . Moreover, one can observe that for every k ≥ 2,
as well asλ
As player v owns exactly two edges, the only strategy v has to connect to G k − v with exactly one edge is that of connecting itself either to some other copy or basic node. Therefore, a lower bound on the broadcast cost of player v if it uses only one edge to connect to a node
In what follows, we show that max{λ(k),λ(k)} = λ(k), thus proving that G k is stable for every B ∈ [λ(k), λ (k)), where in fact λ (k) =λ(k) + n k − 1 − k. Indeed, for every k ≥ 2, and using n k+1 = n k + h + 1, we have that
Furthermore, using the relations n k+1 = n k + h + 1, n k = (h + 1)k, and formulae (4) and (5), we have λ(3) = 2n 3 − 3 andλ(3) = 5 3
To complete the proof, it remains to show that λ(2) ≤ 2n 2 − 3, λ(k + 1) ≤ λ (k), and λ(k) = (kn). We already observe that λ(2) = 2n 2 − 4 ≤ 2n 2 − 3. Moreover, for any k = 2k, it is easy to see that the broadcast cost of a copy node v is λ(k) = (kn), since a constant fraction of the nodes are at distance at least k from v. Finally, using induction and observing that λ(3) ≤ λ (2), we can prove λ(k + 1) ≤ λ (k). Indeed, if k + 1 is even, then
while, if k + 1 is odd, then
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we have introduced a new NCG model in which the emphasis is put on the fact that a player might have a strong requirement about her centrality in the resulting network, which may well happen in decentralized computing (where, for instance, the bound on the maximum distance could be used for synchronizing a distributed algorithm). We developed a systematic study on the PoA of the two (uniform) games MAXBD and SUMBD, showing that PoA rapidly becomes small as soon as the distance bounds grow. However, this study needs to be continued, since a significant gap between the corresponding lower and upper bounds is still open for D = o(n ), for any > 0, and it is worth noting that narrowing this gap would provide a better estimation about how dense a network in equilibrium can be. In particular, we partially achieve this goal for MAXBD for the special case of D = 2, although it seems quite difficult to generalize our lower-bounding argument to larger values of D. Actually, our feeling is that the provided upper bounds are quite tight, while the difficulty of reducing the gap relies on the challenging problem of finding suitable lower-bound constructions. Let us discuss this difficulty in more detail regarding MAXBD.
The following interesting fact can be observed. Recall that a graph is said to be self-centered if every node is a center of the graph (thus, the eccentricity of every node is equal to the radius of the graph, which then coincides with the diameter of the graph). An interesting consequence of Lemma 3.6 is that only stable graphs that are self-centered can be dense, as one can infer from the following. PROOF. Let v be a node with minimum eccentricity. Since G(S) is not self-centered, it must be ε G(S) (v) ≤ D − 1. Then, U = {v} is a dominating set of G D−1 , and Lemma 3.6 implies the claim.
Thus, to improve the lower bound for the PoA of MAXBD, one has to look to selfcentered graphs. Moreover, if one wants to establish a lower bound of ρ, then a stable graph of minimum degree at least ρ − 1 (from Lemma 3.5) is needed. Starting from these observations, we investigate the possibility of using small and suitably dense self-centered graphs as gadgets to build lower-bound instances for increasing values of D. To illustrate the process, see Figure 5 , where by using a self-centered cubic graph of diameter 3 and size 20, we have been able to obtain a lower bound of 3 for MAXBD for D = 3 (it is not very hard to see that the obtained graph is in equilibrium).
Interestingly enough, the gadget is a famous extremal (i.e., maximal w.r.t. node addition) graph arising from the study of the degree-diameter problem, namely, the problem of finding the largest size graph having a fixed maximum degree and a given diameter (for a comprehensive overview of the problem, we refer the reader to [Universitat politècnica de Catalunya 1995] ). More precisely, the gadget is a graph of the largest possible size having maximum degree = 3 and diameter d = 3. In fact, this seems not to be coincidental, since also Moore graphs (which are extremal graphs for d = 2 and = 2, 3, 7, 57), and the extremal graph for d = 4 and = 3 [Universitat politècnica de Catalunya 1995] , can be shown to be in equilibrium for MAXBD for D = 2 and D = 4, respectively, and then they can be used as gadgets (clearly, the lower bounds implied by Moore graphs for D = 2 are subsumed by our result in Theorem 4.5). Note that from this, it follows that we actually have a lower bound of 3 for the PoA of MAXBD also for D = 4. So, apparently there could be some strong connection between the equilibria for MAXBD and the extremal graphs with respect to the degree-diameter problem, and we plan in the near future to explore this intriguing issue which could help us to improve our lower bounds.
Finally, we mention another interesting direction to look relates to convergence issues. More precisely, we plan to investigate whether best (or at least better, given the hardness result of Theorem 3.2) response dynamics might converge to a Nash equilibrium, and under which distance bounds this might possibly take place. Our preliminary analysis shows that the nonconvergence results provided by Kawald and Lenzner [2013] do not extend easily to our model, and so a new ad-hoc approach seems necessary.
